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Abstract
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving distributed recommendation frame-
work, Secure Distributed Collaborative Filtering (SDCF), to preserve the pri-
vacy of value, model and existence altogether. That says, not only the ratings
from the users to the items, but also the existence of the ratings as well as
the learned recommendation model are kept private in our framework. Our
solution relies on a distributed client-server architecture and a two-stage Ran-
domized Response algorithm, along with an implementation on the popular
recommendation model, Matrix Factorization (MF). We further prove SDCF to
meet the guarantee of Differential Privacy so that clients are allowed to specify
arbitrary privacy levels. Experiments conducted on numerical rating prediction
and one-class rating action prediction exhibit that SDCF does not sacrifice too
much accuracy for privacy.
Keywords: Privacy-preserving Recommendation, Differential Privacy, Secure
Distributed Matrix Factorization, Randomized Response Algorithms
2017 MSC: 00-01, 99-00
1. Introduction
Collaborative filtering (CF) is one of the most popular models for recom-
mending items [1]. Its basic idea is to make recommendation based on the sim-
ilarity between users or between items. CF-based models are trained on users’
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Figure 1: Secured distributed architecture using MF as an example.
feedbacks of items, which can be divided into two categories: numerical and
one-class. Numerical feedback consists of numeric value (e.g., ratings between
1 and 5). One-class feedback is a record for a specific action (e.g., purchase or
not). As CF-based models are trained from large data, service providers must
collect numerous feedbacks. However, if the servers are untrusted or contain
vulnerabilities, the collection of user feedbacks can be a privacy liability due
to the data leakage. Even if the servers are curious-but-honest, which means
the services are functioning normally, feedback data leakage can still cause pri-
vate attributes and even real identity of users, to be inferred by hackers[2, 3].
Data leakage in CF-based recommender can be divided into three categories.
The first is Value Leakage: exposure of values of feedbacks, such as the rating
scores. The second is Existence Leakage: exposure of the existence of feedbacks,
such as whether a user rates an item. For example, if the attackers know that
user u rates a book i, they can be quite certain that u has read i. The third
is Model Leakage: exposure of the trained model. Models are important since
given the CF model, attackers can estimate the ratings from any user to any
item.
In this paper, we propose a client-server framework, Secure Distributed Col-
laborative Filtering (SDCF), to preserve user privacy in CF-based recommender.
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We elaborate the idea of SDCF in Fig. 1 that uses Matrix Factorization (MF)
as an example. First, we separate the model into two disjoint parts: personal
elements and public elements. Personal elements are user-specific while pub-
lic elements are those common to every user, such as the items’ information.
We propose to store only public elements on the server, while users keep both
their personal ratings and personal elements at client side, to avoid value and
model leakage. Apparently not all CF-based models meet this requirement. As
will be described later, MF satisfies such condition. The next challenge is how
to train a model on such structure since both parts of elements need to be
updated frequently while training. We propose that during the training, users
download public elements, based on which each user can locally update personal
elements, and then send required information to the server to update public el-
ements. Such distributed mechanism naturally prevents both value and model
leakages, because users do not send the ratings to the server, and with only
public elements, the server cannot perform recommendation solely. To further
prevent the existence leakage, we propose a two-stage Randomized Response al-
gorithm in SDCF. A strength of SDCF is the guarantee of Differential Privacy
(DP) [3, 4], which is a privacy quantification used in various domains. With DP,
SDCF allows users to adjust their privacy levels based on their privacy budgets.
Previous studies of privacy-preserving recommender systems use various ap-
proaches. For example, one of the earliest work [5] proposes a peer-to-peer
network that allows personalized recommendation to be generated by other
members without disclosing individual user data. [6] first applied DP to CF
and is followed by many works including [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Among these
studies, [8, 9, 12, 6] require servers to be trusted in some training stages, and
[7, 13, 11, 5, 10, 14] consider the scenario of completely untrusted servers as our
work does. Nevertheless, most of them rely on certain conditions or resources.
For instance, [11] requires the category information of items, [10] relies on a
small group of users to be public, and [13, 5] need laborious computation for
cryptography algorithms. [7] is probably the most similar to our solution. It
assumes nothing other than the ratings, and preserves the privacy of value and
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model by a distributed gradient-transmission architecture. Still, it requires a
third-party, i.e., an additional server between clients and the server of the service
provider, as its noise sampling method is vulnerable to difference attack defined
by [7]. The concern of a third-party is two-fold. First, the third-party may also
be compromised, and second the employment of an additional third-party can
increase the cost in both building and maintenance. Table 1 summarizes the
features of different solutions. To the best of our knowledge, SDCF is the first
to preserve value, model, and existence privacies and possess the guarantee of
DP. More importantly, all feedback data are kept only at client side, i.e., it will
not have any chance to be released or transmitted to the untrusted server or
any other malicious client.
We choose MF [15] to realize SDCF, and develop Secure Distributed Matrix
Factorization (SDMF), for the following reasons. First, in MF, it is natural to
divide the model into personal (user) U and public (item) V parts (matrices).
Second, if we use gradient descent-based optimization to train the MF model, the
updating of personal elements for different users can be done independently and
locally at each client, meaning that no personal information will be transmitted
to other clients or to the server. Third, the updating of the public element
can be done by aggregating the gradients contributed from clients, meaning
that only gradients of the model are transmitted from clients to the server.
The attackers cannot recover the original ratings nor personal elements even
the gradients are intercepted during transmission. In this paper, we adopt MF
with Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) [12]. As will be discussed
later, SGLD (instead of the popular Stochastic Gradient Descent) enjoys the
advantage of preventing user latent vectors (i.e., personal elements) from being
deciphered. The experiments show that our model can yield reasonably good
recommendation results while guaranteeing decent level of privacy. In Section 5,
we will further discuss how to use SDCF in Factorization Machine-based model
[16].
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Table 1: Comparison between Different Solutions under Untrusted Server Scenario
without Additional
Information
without
3rd Party
Existence
Protected
Model
Protected
Value
Protected
[5]
√ √ √ √
[13]
√ √ √ √
[14]
√ √ √
[10]
√ √ √
[7]
√ √ √
[11]
√ √ √
SDCF
√ √ √ √ √
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential privacy provides a mathematical definition to quantify the pri-
vacy preserved by an algorithm [3, 4]. Here we explain the meaning of DP in
recommender systems. If users aim to preserve the value privacy, a privacy-
preserving algorithm is supposed to lower the server’s confidence in identifying
the actual value of each rating.
Definition 1 (differential privacy). A randomized algorithmA with domain
Rn is -differentially private, if and only if any two datasets X,X ′ ∈ Rn contain
at most one different record (i.e., the hamming distance d(X,X ′) = 1), and for
possible anonymized output O ⊆ Range(A):
Pr[A(X) ∈ O]
Pr[A(X ′) ∈ O] ≤ e
,
where the probability Pr is taken over the randomness of algorithm A, and  is
positive. Lower values of  indicates higher degree of privacy guaranteed.
With Definition 1, we can measure the difference between the outcomes with
and without the presence of an element determined by . However, there is
a trade-off between user privacy and the utility of an algorithm. Our model
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is designed to be a good privacy-preserving algorithm that can maintain the
performance while increasing the degree of privacy.
2.2. Matrix Factorization (MF)
Let U and V be a user set and an item set, and each rij indicates an observed
score that a user i rated an item j in the rating matrix R ∈ R|U|×|V|. MF aims
to make UV T ≈ R, where U ∈ R|U|×K and V ∈ R|V|×K for a given dimension
number K. The objective is to find U and V such that the loss function L(U, V )
can be minimized:
min
U,V
L(U, V ) = min
U,V
∑
i,j∈R
(rij − uivTj )2 + λ(||U ||22 + ||V ||22), (1)
where λ is a given regularization factor to prevent overfitting. Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD) is a popular technique to minimize the objective function
of MF. It aims to iteratively learn ui and vj according to the following updating
rules:
∇ˆuiL(ui, vj) = −eijvj + λui,
∇ˆvjL(ui, vj) = −eijui + λvj ,
ui ← ui − η∇ˆuiL(ui, vj),
vj ← vj − η∇ˆvjL(ui, vj),
(2)
where eij = rij − uivjT is the error of the prediction and η is the learning
rate. These updating rules allow the gradients of ui and vj to be computed
independently, and thus enables the deployment in a distributed environment.
However, applying SGD in a distributed manner may expose ui (i.e., model
leakage) during gradients transmission. To remedy this problem, we introduce
SGLD below.
2.3. Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD)
SGLD [17] is an optimization method, which combines SGD and Langevin
Dynamics that samples from the posterior distribution to prevent overfitting.
Specifically, based on the Bayesian view of MF, we can convert the objective
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into a maximization of posterior distribution of U and V given the observed
ratings and parameters:
p(U, V |R, λr,Λu,Λv) ∝ p(R|U, V, λr)p(U |Λu)p(V |Λv), (3)
where λr is the global regularization term, Λu and Λv are diagonal matrices
generated by Gamma distribution for the regularization of ui and vj . Since a
hypothesis of normal distribution N can be adopted in Eq. 3, the log-likelihood
can be derived from:
F (U, V ) = ln p(U, V |R, λr,Λu,Λv)
= ln p(R|U, V, λr) + ln p(U |Λu) + ln p(V |Λv) + C
= lnN (R|UV T , λ−1r ) + lnN (U |0,Λ−1U ) + lnN (V |0,Λ−1V ) + C,
(4)
where C is a constant. To maximize the log-likelihood and also follow normal
distribution to add noises into gradients to avoid overfitting, the updating rules
of SGLD in the t-th iteration become:
∇ˆuiF (ui, vj) =− eijvj + uiΛu,
∇ˆvjF (ui, vj) =− eijui + vjΛv,
ηt =
η0
tγ
,
ui ←ui − ηt∇ˆuiF (ui, vj) +N (0, ηtI),
vj ←vj − ηt∇ˆvjF (ui, vj) +N (0, ηtI),
where η0 is the initial learning rate, γ is the decay factor, and I is the identical
matrix of size K. As Liu et al. [12] has proved that introducing noises to SGLD
can guarantee the differential privacy. As will be shown later on, our model
using SGLD can avoid the exposure of model.
3. Methodology
3.1. Framework Overview
The overview of the SDMF framework is exhibited in Fig. 2. It is a dis-
tributed framework consisting of several clients and the server. The key idea
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Figure 2: The overview of SDMF framework.
is to divide the model into the private (user) parts and a public (item) part,
and transmit only gradients to avoid leakage. Since MF learns two matrices,
items’ and users’ latent factors, by iteratively performing updates, we consider
items’ latent factors as the public elements in SDCF, thereby being the only
information stored in the server, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In addition, users’
latent factors are treated as personal elements and thus are stored with their
ratings at client side only. With SGD to optimize MF’s objective (Eq. 1), we
define the gradients (denoted by grad(vj) for the latent factors of item i as:
grad(vj) = η∇ˆvjL(ui, vj). The updating rule in Eq. 2 can be rewritten as:
vj ← vj − grad(vj).
The gradients are the only things transmitted from clients to the server. Specif-
ically, in each iteration, each client needs to download the newest V from the
server, then calculates the gradients for ui and vj . The gradients of ui are di-
rectly used to update ui stored at the client side while grad(vj) is sent to the
server, which then updates vj . However, we further look into the formation of
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grad(vj) and find that
grad(vj) = η(eijuj − λvj).
Since vj , η, and λ are public, the server can obtain eijuj . When uj converges,
the server will be able to approximate each uj given several eijuj for different
items within a few iterations, because uj is the greatest common divisor (GCD)
of the values of eijuj .
To avoid the exposure of ui, we propose to use SGLD instead of SGD to
protect the gradients by adding Gaussian noises. The gradients of items can be
re-written as:
grad(vj) = ηt∇ˆvjF (ui, vj)−N (0, ηtI)
= ηt(eijui − vjΛv)−N (0, ηtI).
(5)
Aside from DP proved by [12], the noises introduced make it hard to recover
ui from grad(vj) by GCD. In addition, since the noises in each iteration are
sampled with different values, we are immune to the difference attack mentioned
in [7]. Even if the gradients are exposed, the privacy of model and value can
still be preserved.
3.2. Randomized Response (RR) Algorithm
The existence is still exposed due to the action that user i sends grad(vj)
of item j to the server in SGLD. Thus, instead of sending gradients of all rated
items, our idea is to send the gradients of some unrated items to the server so
that exact items that are rated are unknown. We implement such idea with the
technique of randomized response. A straightforward solution consists of two
steps. First, we create a binary matrix to represent the existence of ratings,
as illustrate in the left part of Fig. 3, in which each user i maintains a binary
vector Bi whose element Bij indicates whether user i rates item j. Second,
in t-th iteration, the client does not send the gradients of all rated items, but
the gradients of a perturbed item set determined by a bit array Sti . This naive
algorithm is shown in the upper right of Fig. 3. Specifically, the bit array Sti
of user i is used to protect the user’s existence by randomizing the rated and
9
U
se
r
Item
0 1 0 1 1 𝑩𝒊
𝑺𝒊
𝒕
Randomized Response
0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0
5 ? 1 ? ?
? 2 ? 1 1
? ? 4 ? 2
3 ? ? 1 1
1 ? 1 5 ?
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1
Permanent RR
Instantaneous RR
𝑩𝒊
𝑩′𝒊
𝑺𝒊
𝒕
Rated ItemUnrated Item
Binary 
Matrix 
𝑩
Two-stage RR
Algorithm
Rating
Matrix 
𝑹
Naive RR
Algorithm
Figure 3: Representing the existence of ratings by a binary matrix (left). Using RR to sample
a noised bit vector Sti from binary vector Bi of user i (upper right). Two-stage RR algorithm
(lower right).
unrated items. If Stij = 1, item j’s gradient will be sent to the server, otherwise
not. We generate the bit array Sti of item i based on its binary vector Bi, given
by:
P (Stij = 1) =
 p, if Bij = 0q, if Bij = 1 ,∀j ∈ V, (6)
where p and q are two given probabilities to determine the number of perturbed
unrated and rated items in Sti . Higher p leads to larger disturbance in the
randomization while higher q preserves the actual rating behavior. Note that
in each iteration t, the bit array Sti of item i is re-generated.
Unfortunately, such simple randomization is vulnerable to the average attack.
Specifically, untrusted server may collect the gradients for a sufficient number
of iterations T and obtain the rating actions by averaging the derived bit array
of user i with the following formula:
1
T
T∑
t=1
(Stij) ≈
 p, if Bij = 0q, if Bij = 1 . (7)
To address this, we propose to realize the idea of randomized response, which
is originally presented by RAPPOR [18], to construct a secured and distributed
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recommender system. Note that we are the first that implements the concept of
randomized response in distributed recommendation. The proposed two-stage
RR algorithm aims to strengthen the perturbation of rated and unrated items
via the binary vector Bi and the bit array Sij . The Permanent Randomized
Response (PRR) stage prevents rating exposure caused by the average attack
over multiple iterations while the Instantaneous Randomized Response (IRR)
stage preserves privacy in every single iteration. Note that PRR will be executed
only once during initialization and IRR will be executed in the beginning of every
iteration.
3.2.1. Permanent Randomized Response (PRR)
We propose to generate a perturbed binary vector B′i to permanently replace
the original Bi so that we can apply the RR mechanism based on not only the
actual rating actions but also some fake “1”s and “0”s. With this strategy,
the average attacker will not be able to derive Bi since all information sent to
server are generated from both fake and actual rating actions. To implement
such idea, when initializing the optimization process, we sample the perturbed
binary vector B′i for each user i by
B′ij =

1,with probability 12f
0,with probability 12f
Bij ,with probability 1− f
,∀j ∈ V, (8)
where the parameter f is a probability specified by the client to control the
strength of perturbation, and thus determines the percentage of actual rating
actions in B′i. With a higher f , it will be more private with more perturbation
but provide less information for the prediction model. Then B′i is fixed and
become the input to IRR in every iteration. Note that instead of letting the
client to provide the probability parameter f , the value of f is automatically
determined by the differential privacy parameter I , which will be introduced
and discussed in Sec. 3.4.
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3.2.2. Instantaneous Randomized Response (IRR)
With the perturbed binary vector B′i derived from PRR, IRR is to implement
the naive approach by generating the bit array Sti . In detail, for each iteration
t, we sample a bit array Sti for every user i based on two probabilities p and q
using Eq. 6, in which the original binary vector Bi is replaced by the perturbed
version B′i. Then the client sends gradients of user i to every item j if S
t
ij = 1.
Note that, since the bit array Sti is generated by the perturbed binary vector B
′
i
in Eq. 8, average attack at the server can at most recover the perturbed version
B′i. We discuss the properties of DP for both PRR and IRR in Sec. 3.4.
3.2.3. Number of Gradients Sent to the Server
Given we can determine the degree of privacy by adjusting the probability
parameters f , p and q, in this subsection, we aim to discuss how these pa-
rameters affect the number of gradients sent to the server which influences the
transmission cost of a distributed recommender system. Recall in Eq. 6 that
the probabilities p and q determine the perturbed rated and unrated items via
the bit array. We can estimate the number of gradients sent by first calculating
the probabilities of sending the gradients of unrated and rated items, denoted
by p? and q?, respectively.
Lemma 1. The probability of sending gradients of unrated item j to the server
is:
p? =P (Stij = 1|Bij = 0)
=P (B′ij = 1|Bij = 0)P (Stij = 1|B′ij = 1)
+ P (B′ij = 0|Bij = 0)P (Stij = 1|B′ij = 0)
=
1
2
f × q +
(
1
2
f + (1− f)
)
× p.
(9)
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The probability of sending gradients of rated item j to the server is:
q? =P (Stij = 1|Bij = 1)
=P (B′ij = 1|Bij = 1)P (Stij = 1|B′ij = 1)
+ P (B′ij = 0|Bij = 1)P (Stij = 1|B′ij = 0)
=
(
1
2
f + (1− f)
)
× q + 1
2
f × p.
(10)
Let the number of items rated by user i be hi, the expected number of gradients
sent to the server is
z = hi × q? + (|V| − hi)× p?. (11)
It is obvious that the fewer gradients to send, the smaller the transmission cost
will be, but the server will get less information to update the model. Therefore,
we can allow users to adjust these parameters according to their needs. In our
experiments, for each user i, we set z to be |R||U| , which is the average number
that each user has rated, so that the total amount of gradients that the server
receives is the same as the original MF and we can make a fair comparison.
Note that with z and Theorem 2, which allows users to specify a privacy budget
I , we can obtain p
? and q?.
3.3. The Gradients of Unrated Items
Now we have only one remaining issue: what to transmit to the server for
an item not rated by the user? For a rated item j, the user i can simply send
its gradient grad(vj) = ηt(eijui − vjΛv)−N (0, ηtI), where eij is the difference
between the predicted and the observed value, rij − uivTj , as mentioned in
Eq. 2. However, if item j is unrated, we cannot get eij because rij does
not exist. Therefore, we propose to sample “fake” eij from the distribution of
observed eij of user i. As pointed out in the Bayesian view of SGLD (Eq. 3),
the probabilities of U and V given the observed ratings are assumed to be in
normal distributions. Consequently, we can shift N (R|UV T , λ−1r ) in Eq. 4 to be
zero mean to obtain the distribution of eij , which is also a normal distribution.
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Figure 4: Steps to sample eij for unrated items.
Therefore, our sampling method for unrated item consists of three steps, as
illustrated in Fig. 4. First, given a certain user i, we can count the sample
mean µ and standard deviation σ from the rated items so the distribution of
ei can be derived. Second, we sample eij for each unrated item j from N (µ, σ)
within a given range [−α, α]. Third, the gradients grad(vj) with sampled eij
can be derived.
Since eij is sampled from the distribution of the rated items, the attacker
cannot distinguish “fake” gradients from actual ones. Besides, the bound in α
can constrain the range of eij to avoid imposing serious noise on the recommen-
dation model. Furthermore, we will discuss how α can be set to control the
privacy level in Section 3.4.
3.4. Differential Privacy in Our Framework
An important feature in our framework is that the level of privacy is con-
trollable based on the parameter f in PRR, the probabilities p, and q in IRR,
as well as the range factor α in computing gradients of unrated items. In this
section, we aim to provide theoretical analysis on how the Differential Privacy
(DP) is related to these parameters so that one can determine the correspon-
dent parameters for arbitrary privacy levels. Although the total privacy budget
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scales up with the number of iterations, here we focus on privacy level of each
single iteration since the number of iterations that SGLD requires to converge
to a certain performance is varied between different datasets. Therefore, we
keep it a decision that should be made by the service providers according to
their particular goals.
DP of Two-stage Randomized Response Algorithm. To control the privacy level
of the proposed two-stage RR algorithm, we will set a few privacy budgets
to control the difficulty for the server to identify the rated items according
to the number of times the gradients of items are sent from the user. In the
following, we prove the DP in PRR and IRR with the privacy budgets P and
I , respectively, and derive the relation between these privacy budgets and the
probabilities f , p, and q.
Theorem 1. With a privacy budget P , PRR is P -differentially private if
P = 2hi ln
(
1− 12f
1
2f
)
.
Proof. Given the number of rated items hi and the item set V, for any binary
vector Bi with |V| elements and containing hi “1”s, without loss of generality,
we can set Bi as b
? = {b1 = 1, ..., bhi = 1, bhi+1 = 0, ..., b|V| = 0}.
Assume OB derived from Equation 8 in PRR, for all b
′ ∈ OB (for simplicity,
we let b′ be any possible B′i), given Bi = b
?, the probability of Bi being changed
into some B′i = b
′ is
P (B′i = b
′|Bi = b?) =
(
1− 1
2
f
)b′1 (1
2
f
)1−b′1
× · · · ×
(
1− 1
2
f
)b′hi (1
2
f
)1−b′hi
×
(
1
2
f
)b′hi+1 (
1− 1
2
f
)1−b′hi+1
× · · · ×
(
1
2
f
)b′|V| (
1− 1
2
f
)1−b′|V|
Then for any pair of B1 and B2 in any possible Bi, we can derive the ratio in
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differential privacy (Definition 1) as below:
P (B′i ∈ OB |Bi = B1)
P (B′i ∈ OB |Bi = B2)
=
∑
b′∈OB
P (B′i = b
′|Bi = B1)∑
b′∈OB
P (B′i = b′|Bi = B2)
≤max
b′∈S
P (B′i = b
′|Bi = B1)
P (B′i = b′|Bi = B2)
=
(
1− 1
2
f
)2(b′1+b′2+···+b′hi−b′hi+1−b′hi+2−···−b′2h)
×
(
1
2
f
)2(b′hi+1+b′hi+2+···+b′2hi−b′1−b′2−···−b′hi )
≤
(
1− 12f
1
2f
)2hi
= eP ,when P = 2hi ln
(
1− 12f
1
2f
)
Theorem 2. With a privacy budget I , IRR is I-differentially private, if
I = hi ln
(
q?(1− p?)
p?(1− q?)
)
, (12)
where p? and q? follow Lemma 1.
Proof. Assume OS derived from Equation 6 in IRR, for s ∈ OS (for simplicity,
we let s be any possible Sti ), given Bi = b
?, the probability of Bi being changed
into some Sti = s is
P (Sti = s|Bi = b?) = (q?)s1(1− q?)1−s1 × · · · × (q?)s
′
hi (1− q?)1−s′hi
×(p?)s′hi+1(1− p?)1−s′hi+1 × · · · × (p?)s′|V|(1− p?)1−s′|V| .
Then for any pair of B1 and B2 in any possible Bi, we can derive the ratio in
differential privacy ( Definition 1. ) as below:
P (Sti ∈ OS |Bi = B1)
P (Sti ∈ OS |Bi = B2)
=
∑
s∈OS
P (Sti = s|Bi = B1)∑
s∈OS
P (Sti = s|Bi = B2)
≤ max
s∈OS
P (Sti = s|Bi = B1)
P (Sti = s|Bi = B2)
≤
(
q?(1− p?)
p?(1− q?)
)hi
= eI ,when I = hi ln
(
q?(1− p?)
p?(1− q?)
)
.
Practically, I is smaller than P because P is the privacy guarantee of
the worst case of suffering from average attack over several iterations. In our
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implementation, we set P = 2I and find f by P . Consequently, given I
specified by the client, we can obtain p and q by solving Eq. 9, 10,11, and 12.
DP of Computation of Gradients to Unrated Items. Here we explain how to
use the range factor α to control the difficulty for the attacker to distinguish
fake gradients of unrated items from gradients of rated items at the server side
according to the numerical values of gradients. Note that this privacy level is
different from the DP of Randomized Response algorithm, which is the difficulty
of detecting rated items according to discrete results of being sampled or not.
Theorem 3. With a privacy budget g, gradients for unrated items are g-
differentially private, if
g = ln
((
1
2
erf
(
x− µ
σ
√
2
)
|α−α
)−1)
, (13)
where α is the range factor, and erf() is the Gauss Error Function:
erf(x) =
1√
pi
∫ x
−x
e−t
2
dt.
Proof. Based on Section 3.3, we have the normal distribution of the observed
eij :
f(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2 ,
where µ and σ are mean and standard deviation of the observed eij . Assume e
′
is any possible eij , then for any possible item pair of j1 and j2, we derive the
ratio in differential privacy ( Definition 1. ) as below:
P (eij = e
′|j = j1)
P (eij = e′|j = j2) ≤
f(e′)∫ α
−α f(x)dx
f(e′)
=
1∫ α
−α f(x)dx
=
1
1
2erf
(
x−µ
σ
√
2
)
|α−α
≤ eg ,when g = ln
((
1
2
erf
(
x− µ
σ
√
2
)
|α−α
)−1)
.
Since it is difficult to directly solve Eq. 13, in our implementation, we set
αMax = Max(|µ+ 2σ|, |µ− 2σ|)
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so that [−α, α] can cover more than 95% of the ratings in the distribution. Then
we do binary search in (0, αMax) to find an α that
eg−δ ≤
(
1
2
erf
(
x− µ
σ
√
2
)
|α−α
)−1
≤ eg ,
where δ is a very small number (e.g. 10−6 in our experiments) so that
g ≈ ln
((
1
2
erf
(
x− µ
σ
√
2
)
|α−α
)−1)
.
3.5. Implementation Details of SDMF
We further explain the procedure on the client-side and server-side during
the training process of SDMF.
3.5.1. Client-side
As step-by-step actions of each iteration t shown in Algorithm 1. A client
first initializes its latent factors, decide the two probabilities used in IRR, p and
q, and conduct PRR as Equation 8 when t = 0. In every iteration t, it downloads
the item latent factors and calculates the prediction error eij of the rated item.
After generating the mean and standard deviation of eij , the client can find a
suitable α. Later, the client will conduct IRR as Equation to generate Sti of this
iteration t. For every item j that Sti = 1, if it is a rated item, the client sends
the server j and grad(vj) as in general SGLD; if it is an unrated item, sample
eij in N(µ, σ) (and re-sample if it is not within a bound of [−α, α]), sending
grad(vj) calculated with this sampled eij and j to the server. After the client
finishes the sending of gradients to the server, it sends a ”finish” signal to the
server and updates its user latent factors with the average updates calculated
before.
3.5.2. Server-side
Algorithm 2 shows how the server starts to training, obtain gradients and
updates items’ latent factors. Comparing with Algorithm 1, it can be seen that
the server have to do very little computation. The server is only in charge of
controlling the start of a new iteration and updating items’ latent factors with
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Algorithm 1 Client (i, t)
Require: Data Input: {V, hi,Ri, Bi}, Model Input: {η0,γ, Λu, Λv}, Privacy
Input: {g, I , P }
1: if t = 0 then
2: Initialize ui
3: Find f with P
4: B′i ← PRR(Bi, f)
5: Find p and q with I and hc
6: if t > 0 then
7: ηt ← η0tγ
8: Download V from Server
9: Sc(t)← IRR(B′i, p, q)
10: u¯i ← 0
11: for j ∈ V do
12: if Bij = 1 then
13: eij ← rij − uivTj
14: u¯i ← u¯i + (ηt(eijvj − uiΛu)−N (0, ηtI))
15: u¯i ← u¯i|Ri|
16: Calculate µ and σ of {eij|∀Bij = 1}
17: Find α with µ, σ and g
18: for j ∈ V do
19: if Si(t)j = 1 and Bij = 1 then
20: grad(vj)← ηt(eijui − vjΛv)−N (0, ηtI)
21: Send (j, grad(vj)) to Server
22: if Si(t)j = 1 and Bij = 0 then
23: while True do
24: Sample eij ∼ N(µ, σ)
25: if α > x > −α then
26: break
27: grad(vj)← ηt(eijui − vjΛv)−N (0, ηtI)
28: Send (j, grad(vj)) to Server
29: Send ”finish” to Server
30: ui ← ui − u¯i
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whatever grad(vj) it receives. In this process, nothing but the items’ latent
factors has to be stored, thereby privacy is preserved. Besides, we can make all
clients compute gradients of all their ratings at the same time for each iteration.
With this parallelization, the time that the server has to wait for all gradients
will be largely reduced, comparing to a centralized training of MF.
Algorithm 2 Server
Require: U , V
1: Initialize V
2: t← 0
3: for i ∈ U do
4: Call Client i to run Client(i, t)
5: t← 1
6: while not converge do
7: Initialize V¯ with all zero
8: Initialize Count = 0
9: for i ∈ U do
10: Call Client i to run Client(i, t)
11: while True do
12: Wait until receiving a (j, grad(vj))
13: V¯j ← V¯j + grad(vj)
14: Count← Count+ 1
15: if receive ”finish” from all of the Clients then
16: break
17: V ← V − V¯Count
18: t← t+ 1
4. Evaluation
We conduct experiments to evaluate the utility of SDMF. Specifically, the
experiments aim to examine the trade-off between privacy and performance of
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Table 2: Statistics for the datasets.
Dataset #Users #Items #Ratings
MovieLens-100K 943 1,682 100,000
MovieLens-1M 6,040 3,900 1,000,209
Netflix (subsampled) 10,000 5,000 573,595
SDMF with MF. The evaluation is designed to answer three questions: (1) Can
SDMF maintain high accuracy while preserving certain level of privacy? (2)
How does the privacy budgets I and g in the proposed two-stage RR method
affect accuracy? (3) How does SDMF perform on both numerical and one-class
rating prediction tasks? Note that the experiments here focus on the effect of
using DP to preserve existence privacy, so we do not compare with other DP
methods such as [7, 11] since their DP algorithms aim to preserve value privacy,
which SDMF can completely preserve with the architecture.
4.1. Datasets & Evaluation Settings
We use three popular public rating datasets for the experiments: two Movie-
Lens datasets 1 (ML-100K and ML-1M) and Netflix data [19]. Note that we
subsample Netflix data to a subset with 10,000 users and 5,000 items, all with
more than 10 ratings to avoid cold-start users, who will contribute little due to
the RR algorithm. The statistics of MovieLens-100K, MovieLens-1M and the
subsampled Netflix dataset are shown in Table 2.
Task 1: Numerical Rating Prediction. We randomly split both rating
datasets into 80% as the training set and 20% as the test set. This random
splitting is repeated for 30 times to obtain the average Root-Mean-Square Error
(RMSE). In order to examine how different privacy levels affect the performance,
we vary the controllable parameters, i.e., the privacy budgets g and I in SDMF.
As data quality (or noise introduced) is determined by -differential privacy,
1https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
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higher values of g and I lead to weaker privacy protection, but maintain the
accuracy of the recommendation model. Hence, we choose to have a wide range
of privacy budgets so that the trade-off between performance and privacy can
be observed. The privacy budgets g and I are chosen from {4, 1, 0.25, 0.0625},
resulting in 16 combinations of privacy budgets in total. Note that we set
P = 2I so that we do not show the results of different P .
The settings of parameters are: K = 50, γ = 0.6, and , (Λu,Λv) ∼
Gamma(1, 100). The learning rate η0 is 5×10−6 for MovieLens-100K, 5×10−7
for MovieLens-1M, and 5 × 10−7 for Netflix, which are tuned to have better
performance based on a validation set made by randomly splitting the training
set into 80%-20%, which are tuned to have better performance based on a vali-
dation set made by randomly splitting the training set into 80%-20%. Besides,
SDMF will be compared to the baselines and competitive methods as listed in
the following.
• Non-private MF: Performing recommendation using the original MF
with SGLD. We compare this non-private version with SDMF to under-
stand how the noises introduced for preserving privacy affect performance.
• Input Perturbation SGLD (ISGLD): We make a comparison to a
na¨ıve strategy of simply adding noises to ratings. Note that this solu-
tion can only preserve value, not model nor existence privacies. We add
Laplacian noises to ratings and train MF using SGLD on these perturbed
ratings to derive ISGLD. The -differential privacy of adding Laplacian
noises to ratings has been proved in [8]. We compare SDMF with ISGLD
with privacy budget  set to 4 and 2, while the former is the largest num-
ber we set for privacy budgets in SDMF and the latter is what reported
to have comparable performance as item average baseline by [8].
• SDMF α = ∞: This is an SDMF given no constraint on the sampled
fake gradient. Hence, it would lead to the highest privacy level for given
fixed g and I in SDMF.
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Task 2: One-Class Rating Action Prediction.. To conduct experiments
of SDMF on the task of one-class feedback, we choose to predict the rating
actions via Bayesian Personalized Ranking Matrix Factorization (BPRMF) [20]
in ML-100K, ML-1M, and the subsampled Netflix dataset. That says, BPRMF
is considered MF technique in our SDMF. The split of training and testing is set
by the leave-one-out strategy, which is the same as BPRMF[20]. Specifically,
we first randomly select one rating action of each user to be added into the
testing set while the training set consists of all rating actions except those in
the testing set. This process is repeated for 10 times to generate the average
Area under ROC Curve (AUC), which indicates the correctness of pair-wise
ranking between a positive (rated) and a negative (unrated) sample. While
the gradients of BPRMF is similar to the basic MF, we can accordingly apply
BPRMF to SDMF by changing the error eij in MF to
−e−xijj′
1+e
−x
ijj′ for rated items
and e
−x
ijj′
1+e
−x
ijj′ for unrated items, where xijj′ = uiv
T
j −uivTj′ denotes the distance
between the predicted ranking scores of a rated item j and an unrated item j′.
The updating rules of using BPRMF in SDMF, termed SD-BPRMF, is shown
in Lemma 2. Since the optimization of BPRMF computes gradients for unrated
items, SD-BPRMF does not need the “fake” errors, and the privacy budget g
is not applied here.
Lemma 2. For a rated item j rated by user i, SD-BPRMF randomly samples
an unrated item j′ and updates its latent factors with
ui ← ui − η0
(
e−xijj′
1 + e−xijj′
(−vj + vj′) + uiΛu
)
+N (0, ηtI),
vj ← vj − η0
( −e−xijj′
1 + e−xijj′
(ui) + vjΛv
)
+N (0, ηtI),
vj′ ← vj′ − η0
(
e−xijj′
1 + e−xijj′
(ui) + vj′Λv
)
+N (0, ηtI).
We compare the performance of SD-BPRMF with the privacy budget I ∈
{4, 1, 0.25, 0.0625} and a non-private version of BPRMF using SGLD as the
baseline. The settings of parameters are: K = 10, (Λu,Λv) ∼ Gamma(1, 100),
γ = 0.6, and P = 2I . The learning rate η0 is 5 × 10−6 for both MovieLens
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datasets (MovieLens-100K and MovieLens-1M), and 10−7 for Netflix dataset,
which are chosen according to the validation set.
4.2. Experimental Results
Since the number of training iterations is positively correlated with the trans-
mission overhead in our framework, there is a trade-off between recommendation
performance and computational cost while the privacy cost are scaled up by the
number of iterations as well. Therefore, we show the experimental results by
presenting the learning curve (i.e., RMSE vs. “number of iterations” up to 100)
for each model. Based on the results, service providers are allowed to choose
the most appropriate numbers in their applications.
Task 1. The learning curves on ML-100K are in Fig. 5a and 5b, the ones on
ML-1M are in Fig. 6a and 6b, and the ones on Netflix are in Fig. 7a and 7b.
It can be seen that the distance between ISGLD ( = 4) and ISGLD ( = 2)
is much greater than the ranges that the same curves in SDMF spread. Such
results reflect that the performance of SDMF is less sensitive to the privacy
budget than ISGLD. This result also shows that SDMF has the advantage to
maintain the accuracy while still enjoying the additional protection on existence
and model privacy. While comparing two privacy budgets, in Fig. 5a, 6a, and
7a, we can see g has a negative relation to RMSE, which means more privacy
yields lower accuracy on prediction. Although SDMF of α = ∞ can already
provide comparable performance with ISGLD ( = 4), controlling α enjoys
arbitrary adjustment of the balance between privacy and accuracy to handle
different circumstances. On the other hand, in Fig. 5b, 6b, and 7b, I has less
influence on the performance than g, which indicates that our two-stage RR
algorithm can achieve good privacy without sacrificing too much accuracy. In a
nutshell, the RMSE values eventually saturate to reasonable quality as the iter-
ation number increases, and the performance of g = 4 is indeed comparable to
the non-private baseline. Such results implies the proposed SDMF can preserve
the rating privacy of users while maintaining the performance of recommender
systems.
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(a) Task 1: Comparison of different g with fixed I .
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(b) Task 1: Comparison of different I with fixed g .
Figure 5: MovieLens-100K
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(a) Task 1: Comparison of different g with fixed I .
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(b) Task 1: Comparison of different I with fixed g .
Figure 6: MovieLens-1M
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(a) Task 1: Comparison of different g with fixed I .
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(b) Task 1: Comparison of different I with fixed g .
Figure 7: Netflix (subsampled)
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Figure 8: Task 2: Comparison of different I .
Task 2 . The results of predicting one-class actions on ML-100K, ML-1M, and
Netflix are shown in Fig. 8a, 8b, and 8c, respectively. Comparing to the non-
private baseline, the loss values in AUC on the three datasets are 0.03, 0.07, and
0.05. Similar to Task 1, I has little influence on the performance. However, the
gap between private version and non-private version is greater than that in Task
1. In our opinion, this is caused by the loss of information due to PRR (Section
3.2.1). In one-class rating action prediction, what PRR does is equivalent to
deleting some rating actions from the training set, and thus generates more
performance damage than in numerical rating prediction. Nevertheless, as we
are the first to exploit differential privacy in one-class recommendation task,
such loss is acceptable because the accuracy is still high enough to be with
certain utility.
5. Discussion
Here we discuss how to apply SDCF to Factorization Machines (FM) [16],
which is another widely-used and robust model for recommendation systems.
We choose FM not only because it can be optimized with gradient descent
but also because many of CF-based methods such as MF, SVD++, and K-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) can actually be expressed as Factorization Machines
with different settings of parameters [16]. The basic idea of FM is to learn the
interactions between variables. To simply explain FM, let us assume the input
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data of the prediction task is a matrix X ∈ Rn×m, where x ∈ Rm describes
a sample with m variables. To model the interactions of d-order, for the c-th
column of total m columns in X, FM will learn a bias weight wc and d latent
vectors vlc ∈ Rkl , where kl is the number of dimensions for the l-th latent vector.
Therefore, the predicted target (e.g., the predicting scores), denoted by yˆ(x), is
defined as
yˆ(x) = w0 +
m∑
c=1
wcxc +
d∑
l=2
m∑
c1=1
· · ·
m∑
cd=cd−1+1
 l∏
ζ=1
xcζ
 kl∑
a=1
 l∏
ζ=1
vlcζa
 .
For recommendation systems, each rating will be formulated as an x such
that the information about the user and the item can be represented in a format
of dummy code as shown in below:
x = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|U|
, 0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|V|
, x|U|+|V|+1, · · · , xm︸ ︷︷ ︸
other variables
),
where other variables describe information such as time, age of user, categories
of item, or other attributes about the rating. To incorporate SDCF with FM,
we can consider vlc and wc for all c ≤ |U| as personal elements while other bias
weights and latent vectors are treated as public elements. In this way, users can
download public elements, update their own vlc and wc, and then send gradients
for other bias weights and latent vectors to the server.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper proposed a framework, SDCF, to preserve privacy of value, model,
and existence. The differential privacy of two-stage Randomized Response al-
gorithm and the method we use to compute gradients for unrated items are
theoretically justified. Experimental results demonstrate the ability of SDCF to
be applied to both prediction tasks of numerical ratings and one-class rating ac-
tions without sacrificing too much accuracy. To improve the feasibility of SDCF
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for practical usage, in the future we plan to work on the scenario of active learn-
ing to lower down the transmission overhead and the scenario of online learning
to renew the model without re-training from scratch. Besides, we plan to extend
this framework to content-based models and other models that also use gradient
descent to learn latent representations (e.g., deep learning framework) so the
applications will not be limited to only recommender systems.
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